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This paper aims to explain the relationship between product quality, price and convenience with a positive attitude and intention to buy traditional food. In addition, it also aims to explain the role of the product type in moderating the relationship between these variables.

Samples were taken non-randomly, consisting of 500 snack food buyers and 500 restaurant food buyers. Some of the places chosen for sampling include Paragon Mall, Solo Grand Mall, Matahari Mall, Hartono Mall or other places in Surakarta-Indonesia, where people spend time relaxing. Furthermore, multiple structural equations model (multi group SEM) is a statistical method used to explain the relationship between the conceptual variables.

Some of the findings are as follows: before the product as a moderator, price and quality are the variables that influence the positive attitude and the intention to buy, while the convenience is the variable found not affecting both the positive attitude and the intention to buy. After the product type as a moderator, for snacks, the test results indicate that the price, product quality and convenience are the variables that affect the positive attitude but do not affect the intention to buy. For restaurant food, test results indicate that only prices and qualities affect positive attitudes, whereas convenience is found not to affect positive attitudes. Furthermore, only price and quality affect the intention to buy, while convenience is found not to affect the intention to buy.

This paper underlines that the type of product is a moderating variable in the buying behavior process of traditional foods. Regarding its role as a moderator variable, the relationships between variables that are conceptualized can be explained in detail, along with their significance.

Willard A. Hanna's astute observation above about the institutionalization of corruption in Indonesia was published in August 1971, five years after President Soeharto assumed power. The origins of corruption in Indonesia can be traced to the Dutch colonial period as bribery was rife among the lowly paid personnel of the Dutch East India Company (Day, 1966, pp. 100–103). However, corruption became institutionalized during President Soeharto's 32-year reign as his cronies and family “made an art form of creaming off many of Indonesia's most profitable ventures … while being protected by monopoly regulations and their relationship to the president” (Kingsbury, 1998, p. 202). Raymond Bonner (1988, p. 80) has used the euphemism “the family business” to describe “the corruption surrounding members of the Suharto family,” which was “a public secret” in 1988.